[Japan trip 2025] Yasukuni Jinja, a shrine of martyrs and the place of taboo

中文版請按此
 
Date: 4th January 2025 (Saturday)
 
 
'Let's meet at Kudan' (九段で会おう), 'Goodbye, the next time we meet will be at Kudanzaka' (お別れも、今度会う日は、九段坂) – these were the last words exchanged between kamikaze pilots and their comrades before embarked on their suicide missions, as well as messages written by graduates of the kamikaze training during their farewells. 'Kudan' or 'Kudanzaka' refers to the location of Yasukuni Jinja. What is it about this place that exerted such a powerful pull, leading soldiers of the time to choose death over surrender? And how is this magnetic force connected to Yasukuni Jinja?
 
In this article, I will not only share my personal sightseeing experience but also explore some historical background and engage in discussions on various topics. These include the process of enshrining war criminals; the legitimacy of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East; the relationship between Yasukuni Jinja and politics; the role of the Indian judge at the tribunal, Pal, who denied Japan's war crimes; the Emperor's responsibility in the war; the cultural differences between Chinese and Japanese attitudes toward the deceased; and, the perspectives of neighbouring countries.
 
A quick note: this is a rather lengthy article. Sections on sightseeing will be written in the default font colour, while historical background and discussions will be in blue. Any inaccuracies found in the shrine or its associated exhibition, the Yûshûkan, will be marked in red. If you're only interested in the sightseeing experience, feel free to skip over the blue sections.
 
Leaving Asakusa, walk for around 10 minutes to reach Tawaramachi (田原町) station, where I can take the Tokyo Metro Ginza Line to Nihombashi (日本橋). After that, change to the Tôzai Line and alight at Kudanshita (九段下) station. From Exit 1, walk straight for about 3 minutes, and I will arrive at Yasukuni Jinja (靖国神社).
 
Tawaramachi station
 
Tokyo Metro Ginza Line train (Tokyo Metro fleet Series 1000)
 
Tokyo Metro Tôzai Line train (TRTA fleet Series 07)
 
Exit 1, Kudanshita station
 
Yasukuni Jinja is a Shinto shrine dedicated to those who sacrificed their lives for the nation (or more precisely, for the Emperor), including 14 individuals convicted as Class-A war criminals by the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE or Tokyo Trial) following World War II. This particular aspect is the main point of contention surrounding the Shrine.
 
Due to the New Year holidays, many local Japanese people were visiting Yasukuni Jinja today to pay their respects, alongside quite a few tourists coming to see the site as well.
 
Yasukuni Jinja and the Alluring Power of Preferring Death Over Surrender
 
Following the Meiji Restoration, in a bid to solidify the legitimacy of the Emperor's rule, the Meiji government introduced the policy of State Shinto (国家神道), where shrines were managed and operated by the state, and Shinto became the essential 'faith' for all Japanese citizens. The Meiji government declared that 'Shinto' was not a religion, but a 'belief' expressing traditional morality and patriotism. While the Constitution of the Empire of Japan guaranteed freedom of religion, the 'Shinto' belief was positioned as transcendent, with no other religion allowed to contradict it.
 
According to Shinto belief, Amaterasu Ômikami (天照大御神) is the ruler of all gods, and the Japanese Emperor is said to be a direct descendant of Amaterasu, meaning the Emperor is not a human but a 'living god', a divine being existing among humans, and the highest earthly ruler. Everyone is expected to be loyal to the Emperor and to act in accordance with his will. The Emperor's position is considered even higher than that of the European monarchs, who are seen as divinely chosen yet remain human. The Japanese Emperor, on the other hands, is the son of a god – he is a god, not a human.
 
Yasukuni Jinja was also established by the Meiji government to enshrine those who died in service of the country (and the Emperor). Every year, the Emperor personally visits the shrine to kneel and pay his respects, making it the only place where the reigning Emperor kneels in worship, aside from previous emperors and Amaterasu. This is the source of the Japanese soldiers' obsession with death over surrender; even if one did not die in battle, choosing seppuku (ritual suicide) would elevate their soul to the status of a divine being, to be worshipped even by the Emperor. Surrendering, however, would bring disgrace. This is the influence of State Shinto.
 
The Process of Enshrining War Criminals
 
Yasukuni Jinja became a controversial topic, but not immediately after Japan's defeat in World War II. The controversy began with this man – MATSUDAIRA Nagayoshi (松平 永芳), the 6th Gûji (chief priest) of the shrine, who included 14 Class-A war criminals among those enshrined. Matsudaira was military officer, having reached the rank of Lieutenant Commander (海軍少佐) before Japan's defeat. After the war, he joined the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force and retired with the rank of Colonel (1 等陸佐). He later became the director of the Fukui City History Museum (福井市立郷土歴史博物館). However, no single person can be solely credited with causing any historical event; understanding the broader context of the time is essential.
 
In the 1950s, the families of war criminals began requesting the enshrinement of their relatives, and later formed the Japan War-Bereaved Families Association (日本遺族会). In 1953, the Ministry of Justice classified war criminals who were executed or who died while serving their sentences as 'perish in duty', thus providing them with a 'ticket' to be enshrined at Yasukuni Jinja. In 1956, the Ministry of Health and Welfare (MHW) began arranging the enshrinement process with the shrine, but in order to minimise public backlash, the process was kept low-profile. Between 1959 and 1967, Yasukuni Jinja performed multiple soul-conducting and enshrinement rituals for Class-B and C war criminals. Only invited family members were allowed to attend, and these events were not publicly disclosed.
 
Yasukuni Jinja does not provide individual ihai (位牌, memorial tablet). Instead, it has a register listing the names of those enshrined – the Reijibo (霊璽簿, Symbolic Registry of Deities). First, the shrine performs a ritual to invite the souls of the enshrined back to the shrine. Then, during the enshrinement ceremony, their names are recorded in the Reijibo, officially making them deities worshipped at the shrine.
 
Since the Class-B and C war criminals were relatively unknown to the public, and because the shrine handled the process discreetly, the enshrinement was completed quickly. But what about the Class-A war criminals? These were all high-profile figures, and their enshrinement became a political minefield for the shrine. As early as 1966, the MHW submitted a list of 12 Class-A war criminals to the shrine. However, the Gûji at the time, TSUKUBA Fujimaro (筑波 藤麿), believed that the enshrinement of Class-A criminals should be approached with great caution and not rushed. Therefore, during his tenure, there was no progress on this matter.
 
On 20th March 1978, Tsukuba passed away, and Matsudaira succeeded him as Gûji on 1st July. Due to Matsudaira's personal background and the impatience of the bereaved families, Matsudaira secretly enshrined the 14 Class-A war criminals on 17th October 1978, just three months after assuming his position. Even the sitting Prime Minister at the time, FUKUDA Takeo (福田 赳夫), who visited the shrine the following day, only found out about the enshrinement after his visit. The number of individuals enshrined was two more than the 12 names submitted by the MHW, including MATSUOKA Yôsuke (松岡 洋右) and NAGANO Osami (永野 修身), both of whom had died before their sentences were handed down.
 
The International Military Tribunal for the Far East
 
Matsudaira and many right-wing groups in Japan generally reject the rulings made by the IMTFE (Tokyo Trials), which was composed of the Allied powers. As the victorious nations that had endured painful wartime experiences, it is understandable that the Allies would feel vindicated by the tribunal's decisions. However, from an objective standpoint, the Tokyo Trials can certainly be controversial.
 
First, the judges and prosecutors were all from the Allied powers, with even neutral countries being excluded. Moreover, the tribunal only held the defeated nations accountable for their actions and responsibilities, while making no mention of the inhumane acts committed by the Allied forces, nor did it pursue the responsibility of Emperor Shôwa (昭和天皇). Additionally, the 'law' used in the Tokyo Trials – the IMTFE Charter – was a retroactive law, violating the widely accepted judicial principle of not applying laws retrospectively.
 
Even among the Allied nations, there were critics of the fairness of the trials, including the American diplomat George F. Kennan, who had served as the Director of the Policy Planning Staff at the US State Department, as well as US Ambassador to the Soviet Union. Kennan argued that the Tokyo Trials had no legal foundation, but were merely a continuation of wartime actions and were unrelated to justice, and thus should not be cloaked in the guise of legal procedure. However, he was not sympathetic to the war criminals; rather, he pointed out the hypocrisy of masking military actions with judicial formalities. He believed that military matters should be resolved by military means and suggested that the more appropriate approach would have been for the Allies to executed war criminals immediately upon capture.
 
There were also voices within the tribunal itself that questioned the fairness of the Tokyo Trials. One of the most notable critics was the Indian judge, Radhabinod Pal. This figure will be discussed further later in the article. In addition to Pal, the French judge Henri Bernard and the Dutch judge Bernard Röling also agreed that the Tokyo Trials were not entirely fair.
 
While Japan's war crimes are well-documented in textbooks, the question remains: did the Allied forces have their own dark history? There are documented cases of the Nationalist Chinese Army, the British Army, and the American forces abusing or killing Japanese prisoners of war. The Nationalist Chinese Army even engaged in the mass killing of civilians who had been forced into submission by the Japanese military, kidnapping local men to serve in the army, and enslaving forced labourers to the point of death. The American forces were also responsible for widespread sexual crimes in Japan. On the surface, these crimes were investigated internally by the Allies, and where necessary, referred to military courts, but in reality, the vast majority of such cases were left unresolved.
 
So, what exactly are Class-A, B, and C war criminals? There are the categories used by the Allies in dealing with the defeated nations. Class-A refers to those who committed the 'crimes against peace', Class-B refers to 'war crimes', and Class-C refers to 'crimes against humanity'. Only 'war crimes' are governed by pre-existing international treaties, such as the Hague Conventions and the Geneva Conventions. The 'crimes against peace' and 'crimes against humanity' were created by the Allies as post-facto laws to deal with the defeated nations. The Class-A, B, and C classifications are simply categories and do not necessarily indicate the severity of the crimes committed. It was only the Class-A war criminals who were processed by the Tokyo Trials.
 
The Tokyo Trials certainly provided a sense of justice for the countries that suffered from Japanese aggression, but that does not mean they were entirely just. At the same time, they also provided an excuse for right-wing factions in Japan, who, through the tribunal's perceived injustices, used it as a basis to completely deny Japan's war crimes.
 
A Shrine Surviving in the Political Gaps
 
Japanese politicians, particularly the Prime Minister, face strong condemnation from China and Korea whenever they visit Yasukuni Jinja. In fact, the issue surrounding Yasukuni Jinja's existence, whether or not to visit it, and the reactions follow such visits, often seem to be more about politics than history or religion.
 
Since the end of the war, the fate of Yasukuni Jinja has been a political tug-of-war between the US and Japan, and even between the US and the Soviet Union. When the Allied forces occupied Japan, there were plans to abolish Yasukuni Jinja. The American military saw it as a symbol of State Shinto and militarism, believing it should be completely eradicated. However, at the same time, there were voices in the US arguing that 'the religious freedom of a defeated nation should not be trampled upon'.
 
After extensive negotiation between the shrine and the General Headquarters of Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (GHQ), the GHQ eventually agreed to allow the shrine to remain as an independent religious entity, severed from the state. On the surface, this appeared to spare Yasukuni Jinja from abolition. However, behind the scenes, the GHQ secretly prohibited the Japanese government from transferring the state-owned land on which the shrine stood to Yasukuni, effectively forcing its relocation. Without a suitable place to go, the shrine was expected to 'naturally fade away'.
 
However, in 1951, a turning point came: the GHQ unexpectedly agreed to transfer state-owned land to the shrine. The reason? Politics. By then, the Cold War between US and the Soviet Union was intensifying, and the US feared that being too harsh on Japan might push she towards the communist bloc. After all, behind the shrine were over two million bereaved families, and any anti-American sentiment could give the Soviet Union an opening to gain influence.
 
China often accuses Japanese politicians of visiting Yasukuni Jinja solely to garner support. There is, perhaps, some truth in this, as it's common for political figures to act with political motives. The tradition of Prime Ministers visiting the shrine has been long-established, continuing even after the enshrinement of Class-A war criminals. It's not merely reaction to sudden political needs. After all, behind Yasukuni Jinja stands a group of people whom even the US dares not challenge – the bereaved families – and politicians cannot afford to ignore them.
 
Earlier, I briefly mentioned the Japan War-Bereaved Families Association, the country's largest association of war bereaved families, representing over 1.4 million households and a membership exceeding 8 million people. Though this makes up only 8% of the electorate, it can still play a pivotal role in elections when necessary. Right-wing individuals tend to support the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), and the party finds it easier to maintain the loyalty of these 8 million 'hardcore' supporters than to try to win over ordinary voters. A visit to Yasukuni Jinja serves this purpose well. Of course, political figures do not visit the shrine purely for political calculation, but political motivations certainly play an indispensable role.
 
On the other hand, when Japanese political figures visit Yasukuni Jinja, it often provokes a strong reaction from China, which, in turn, garners support from many Japanese citizens. Due to China's unfriendly stance and the sometimes uncivilised behaviour of Chinese tourists, the Japanese public has long held a negative view of China. What they support is not necessarily the act of visiting the shrine itself, but rather the provocative gesture that elicits an overreaction from China.
 
For China and Korea, especially those struggling with internal issues, the common tactic is to shift attention abroad, exaggerating the threat of a foreign adversary. In these countries, this strategy works remarkably well. The visit of a Japanese politician to Yasukuni Jinja is almost a gift. Among all the countries that Japan invaded, only two react strongly, and the whole nation unites in the condemnation. Meanwhile, domestic issues seem to vanish, as if the ongoing issue of Yasukuni Jinja provides a convenient distraction, allowing people to focus on external matters rather than internal ones.
 
Over the years, many have suggested different ways to resolve the issue surrounding Yasukuni Jinja, including separating the enshrinement of war criminals or establishing new secular memorial facilities. Yet, all of those proposals have come to nothing. Perhaps the reason for this is that resolving the issue might not benefit all sides. Rather than being a purely religious site, Yasukuni Jinja has become a stage for political theatre. The war criminals believed that, after their deaths, they would receive the Emperor's veneration at the shrine. Yet, the long-awaited visit from the Emperor never came after the enshrinement of the Class-A war criminals. Ultimately, they became political tools, which, in some ways, is rather tragic.
 
Daiichi Torii (The First Torii Gate)
 
The Daiichi Torii (第一鳥居) was erected in 1921. Described in a poem as 'the great gate that seems to pierce the sky', it quickly became a popular landmark. However, due to years of damage caused by exposure to elements, the gate was removed in 1943. The current torii was dedicated in 1974 by comrade-in-arms and worshippers.
 
This is the largest torii in Japan, constructed using the latest weather-resistant steel technology. The columns stand 25 metres tall, with a diameter of 2.5 metres, while the top crossbeam (kasagi, 笠木) measures 34 metres in length, with a diameter 2.7m, weighing 100 tonnes. It is designed to withstand an earthquake registering up to 7 on the Japan Meteorological Agency Seismic Intensity Scale (approximately a Magnitude 9.0) and winds of up to 80 metres per second without swaying. Its expected lifespan of 1,200 years is truly remarkable.
 
Statue of Family Members Seeing Soldiers Off to War
 
Memorial Monument to the Hitachimaru
 
Monument to the Fallen Soldiers of the Tanaka Detachment
 
The Hitachimaru Incident (常陸丸事件) occurred during the Russo-Japanese War in 1904. At the time, the Japanese military was preparing for the naval operations against Russia. Lieutenant Colonel SUCHI Genjirô (須知 源次郎) led the military transport ship Hitachimaru, which departed from Ujina Port (宇品港) with the intention of heading to the battlefield. On 15th June, when the Hitchimaru reached the vicinity of Okinoshima (沖ノ島), it was attacked by a Russian warship. As the Hitachimaru was not a warship, it had no means of retaliation and was sunk instantly. Around 1,000 people, including Lieutenant Colonel Suchi and Navy Commander YAMAMURA Yashirô (山村 弥四郎), perished in the attack.
 
The Memorial Monument to the Hitachimaru was originally located in Chidorigafuchi Park (千鳥ヶ淵公園), but after World War II, it was removed due to concerns that it might 'stimulate hostile sentiments among the public and harm international friendship'. In 1965, the memorial was restore in Yasukuni Jinja.
 
On 25th February 1919, the 72nd Infantry Regiment (Tanaka Detachment), under the command of Major TANAKA Katsusuke (田中 勝輔), took part in the Siberian Intervention, join the Allied Powers' effort from World War I in the Russian Civil War. They supported the White Army, led by the Tsarist forces, in their struggle against the Bolshevik Red Army. The Tanaka Detachment found itself surrounded by an enemy force vastly superior in number, and tragically, nearly all its members were killed in action.
 
Irei No Izumi (慰霊の泉, Soul-Comforting Spring)
 
Statue of OMURA Masujirô
 
The Statue of ÔMURA Masujirô (大村益次郎銅像) was completed in 1898 following a donation from his disciples. It was Japan's first Western-style bronze statue and quickly became a prominent landmark in Tokyo. Standing at 12 metres, it was created by the sculptor ÔKUMA Ujihiro (大熊 氏廣).
 
Ômura is often referred to as the 'Father of the Japanese Army'. Born in the Chôshû Domain (長洲藩, now part of Yamaguchi Prefecture), he was well-versed in Western studies and played a crucial role in the establishment of the Meiji government, helping to lay the foundations for Japan's modern military. Ômura also proposed the creation of the Tokyo Shôkonsha (東京招魂社), a precursor to Yasukuni Jinja. On 13th August 1869, while inspecting military facilities in the Kansai region, Ômura was assassinated by samurai opposed to military reforms at an inn in Kyoto. He was gravely wounded and died on 5th November, aged 47.
 
Ishi Torii (The Stone Torii Gate)
 
Outer Garden Rest Area
 
Daini Torii (The Second Torii Gate)
 
Giant Lantern
 
The Daini Torii (第二鳥居) was completed in 1887 and is the largest bronze torii in Japan. The columns appear seamless, and it was cast using the most advanced technology of the Meiji era, at the Osaka Arsenal's reverberatory furnace.
 
In front of the torii stand two stone Giant Lanterns (大灯籠), each 13 metres tall, making them among the largest granite lanterns in Japan. The base of each lantern is adorned with reliefs depicting scenes from the First Sino-Japanese War (日清戦爭) and the Mukden Incident (満洲事変). The left lantern features reliefs depicting the Army, while on the right one depicts scenes of the Navy, with seven reliefs on each side. These were created by four artisans under the supervision of MASAKI Naohiko (正木 直彦), Director of the Imperial Art Academy (帝国芸術院). After World War II, because the reliefs were associated with militarism, the GHQ initially ordered the lanterns to be dismantled. However, the Shrine managed to protect the reliefs by covering them with cements, thus preventing their destruction. After the end of the occupation, the cement was removed, and the reliefs were restored to their original state.
 
Ôtemizusha (Main Purification Fountain)
 
Shimmon (The Gate of Gods)
 
The current Ôtemizusha (大手水舎), the main purification fountain, was donated in 1940 by an association of Japanese veterans residing in the United States. Made of granite, it weighs 18 tonnes. The previous purification fountain, donated by the Tsu Domain (津藩) in 1869, originally stood in the same location but has since been relocated to the interior of the Sanshûden (参集殿).
 
The Shimmon (神門), the main gate and entrance to Yasukuni Jinja, was completed in 1934. The gate's door panels stand 6 metres tall, and the doors are inlaid with a Royal Chrysanthemum Seal, measuring 1.5 metres in diameter. The petals of the chrysanthemum design symbolise the rays of the sun. Since the early Meiji era, the 'Double 16-Petal Chrysanthemum' has been the official seal of the Royal Family.
 
Yasukuni-no Sakura (Cherry trees in Yasukuni)
 
The sample tree for Japan Meteorological Agency announcement of cherry blossoming
 
Nogakudô (Theatre of Noh)
 
Passing through the Shimmon, one enters an area known as 'Yasukuni-no Sakura' (靖国の桜), which is one of Tokyo's most famous cherry blossom viewing spots. The ground are home to 500 cherry trees of the Somei Yoshino variety (prunus × yedoensis) and they attract up to 500,000 visitors each year. The Japan Meteorological Agency also uses a 'sample tree' at the Shrine to announce the cherry blossom bloom status. However, I won't find cherry blossoms in winter!
 
Next to Yasukuni-no Sakura stands the Nôgakudô (能楽堂), a Noh theatre. Noh is a major form of classical Japanese dance-drama. The theatre was established in 1881 at Shiba Park (芝公園) to preserve and develop Japan's traditional Noh art. In addition to Noh performances, the theatre also hosts various traditional arts and martial arts events during major occasions such as New Year's, the spring and autumn festivals, and the Mitama Matsuri (Soul Festival).
 
Chûmon Torii (The Central Torii Gate) and Haiden (the Main Hall)
 
Sanshûden (Assembly Hall)
 
Directly in front of the Haiden (Main Hall) is the Chûmon Torii (中門鳥居), which was originally a door gate. The current torii, donated in 2006 by the Bussho Gônenkai (佛所護念会), a Buddhist organisation, is made from cypress wood sourced from Saitama Prefecture, with the trees being approximately 500 years old.
 
The Haiden (拝殿) was built in 1901, the same year as the birth of Emperor Shôwa (Hirohito). Groups of bereaved families, comrades, and worshippers from across the country perform purification rites in the Haiden before proceeding to the Honden (本殿, the main sanctuary). For general visitors, 'worship' typically takes place in front of the Haiden.
 
Behind the Haiden is the Honden, where the 'heroic souls' from the late Edo period through World War II are enshrined. The Honden was constructed in 1872 and designed by the architect ITÔ Heizaemon (伊藤 平左衛門). Only those participating in the 'formal worship' are permitted to enter the Honden. Behind the Honden stands the Reijibo Hoanden (霊璽簿奉安殿), which houses the Symbolic Registry of Deities. Currently, around 2,000 volumes of Reijibo contain the names of approximately 2.4 million 'heroic souls'.
 
The Amulet Office is where visitors can purchase sacred items, such as charms, omamori (御守), and fortune slips, as well as various souvenirs and publications. Adjacent to it is the Sanshûden, which serves both as the entrance for 'formal worshippers' and as a resting place for them.
 
Memorial Statue for Honouring Horses
 
Memorial Statue for Carrier Pigeons
 
Memorial Statue for Dogs in Warfare
 
Between the Sanshûden and the Yûshûkan museum stand three bronze statues, each commemorating animals that served during wartime: horses, carrier pigeons and dogs.
 
The statue honouring horses is a life-sized bronze depiction of a horse in battle, dedicated to the horses that lost their lives on the battlefield. It is estimated that around 200,000 horses perished during World War II. Erected in 1958 through public donations, the statue was created by the sculptor ITÔ Kunio (伊藤 国男).
 
The statue of carrier pigeons, unveiled in 1982 and titled 'Pigeon and Earth', honours the messenger pigeons that played a vital role during wartime. The tower accompanying the symbolises the hope for world peace and is dedicated to the pigeons' invaluable contributions during the war.
 
The statue of dogs, erected in 1992, commemorate the German Shepherd dogs that served as loyal companions to soldiers during the war.
 
The facade of Yûshûkan (the original entrance)
 
The current entrance of Yûshukan
 
Adjacent to the Sanshûden is the Yûshûkan (遊就館), a war museum affiliated with Yasukuni Jinja. The museum's exhibits and explanations are presented entirely from a Japanese perspective, which has led some critics to describe it as 'the worst military museum in the world'. In 2006, under pressure from the US, the museum revised certain aspects of its content.
 
The idea for the Yûshûkan originated in 1877, proposed by then Minister of the Army, YAMAGATA Aritomo (山縣 有朋). It was intended to showcase the noble deeds of those enshrined at Yasukuni and display historical weapons and military equipment. The first Yûshûkan was completed in 1881 and opened on 25th Februry. However, it was severely damaged by the 1923 Great Kantô earthquake (関東大震災) and had to be dismantled and rebuilt. Construction of the new building began in 1930, was completed the following year, and the museum reopened on 26th April 1932.
 
In May 1945, the museum suffered further damage during the Bombing of Tokyo, with many of its exhibits destroyed. After Japan's defeat in World War II, the Yûshûkan was shut down, bringing on end to its 64 years of operation. It was subsequently requisitioned by the Allied forces and repurposed as the headquarters of Fukoku Life Insurance. Plans for the museum's restoration began in 1980, and it officially reopened in July 1986.
 
The free temporary exhibition 'New Year Sword Exhibition' (新春刀剣展)
 
The side facing the Sanshûden originally served as the main entrance to the Yûshûkan, featuring a plaque inscribed with the name 'Yûshûkan' in Japanese by Kotohito, Prince of Kan'in (閑院宮 載仁親王), the younger blood brother of Emperor Meiji. Prince of Kan'in served as the Chief of the Imperial General Staff from 1931 to 1940 and was a significant figure during World War II. However, he passed away before Japan's defeat and did not face the Tokyo Trials.
 
In 2002, a new glass entrance hall was added to mark the 130th anniversary of the Shrine's founding, and this now serves as the current entrance to the museum.
 
The Yûshûkan is spread across two floors, with only the Entrance Hall being freely accessible. Connected to the Entrance Hall is an exhibition space that hosts temporary displays; on the day of my visit, the exhibition is the 'New Year Sword Exhibtion'. Admission to other sections costs JP¥1,000 for adults. Additionally, aside from the Entrance Hall and the Great Exhibition Hall, photography is prohibited in most of the exhibition areas. In the Entrance Hall, you can find displays such as a Zero Fighter Model 52, a C56 steam locomotive, a Type 89 15cm cannon, and a Type 96 15cm howitzer.
 
Mitsubishi Type 0 Carrier-Based Fighter Model 52
 
The Type 0 Carrier-Based Fighter, colloquially known as the 'Zero Fighter' Model 11, was officially introduced into service in 1940. The aircraft made its first combat sortie in September 1940, engaging in aerial battles with Soviet-made Chinese aircraft over Chungking (重慶, now known as Chongqing). The Zero successfully shot down most of the Chinese planes with no losses on the Japanese side, achieving unprecedented success and briefly being hailed as the world's most powerful fighter aircraft.
 
The model on display at the museum is the Zero Fighter Model 52, an improved version of the original. Compared to the earlier models, the wings were shortened and redesigned with a more curved shape. It was also equipped with the 'Sakae 21' engine and a thrust-type single exhaust pipe, which significantly increased its flight speed, making it the most important and advanced version of the Zero fighter.
 
Class C56 locomotive
 
The Class C56 steam locomotive on display was manufactured by Nippon Sharyo in 1936 and was initially served in the Nanao locomotive district in Ishikawa Prefecture. During World War II, 90 C56 locomotives were requisitioned for operations in the southern theatres. This particular locomotive, No. 31, participated in the inauguration of the Thai-Burma Railway. After the war, it continued to serve with the State Railway of Thailand. Following its retirement is 1977, it was purchased by members of the Japanese South Army field unit, who had been involved in the construction of the railway. In 1979, it was donated to Yasukuni Jinja.
 
In 1942, to facilitate the Japanese Army's advance into Burma and India, a railway was constructed connecting Nong Pladuk in Thailand to Thanbyuzayat in Burma, covering a distance of 415 km. The railway was built to Japan National Railways specifications, with the 5th and 9th Railway Regiments responsible for its construction. According to the museum, around 170,000 Allied prisoners of war and local residents were forcibly conscripted to build the railway, though the actual number may have been varied.
 
The museum presents the following information: 'The railway was completed at an astonishing speed, opening in October 1943 after just one year and three months of construction. The British had also considered building this railway, but due to various reasons, it was never realised. The construction was incredibly difficult, with harsh terrain and extreme tropical conditions.' (This part is written in Japanese only.) This narrative suggests that the Japanese accomplished what the British had planned but could not realise. However, it is important to note that Burma was a part of British Empire at the time, and the British had intended the railway for practical purposes related to their imperial needs. In contrast, Japan constructed the railway solely its military objectives, so the two situations are not directly comparable.
 
The rapid construction came at a tremendous human cost. Up to 250,000 Southeast Asian civilians were forcibly conscripted or a abducted to work on the railway, many from India, Malaya, Burma, and Thailand. Of these, 90,000 died during construction. Additionally, Allied prisoners of war were subjected to forced labour in violation of the Geneva Conventions, with 12,000 soldiers dying as a result. Due to the staggering death toll, the Thai-Burma Railway became known as the 'Death Railway'.
 
Type 89 15cm cannon and Type 96 15cm howitzer
 
The Type 89 15cm cannon and the Type 96 15cm howitzer on display both saw action during the Battle of Okinawa. After the war, they were maintained by the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force and the US military in Japan before being donated to Yasukuni Jinja for exhibition.
 
After viewing the exhibits in the Entrance Hall, visitors are directed to the exhibition areas on the 2/F. Unfortunately, photography is prohibited inside these areas. The first section briefly explores the spirit and history of Japan's martial culture, displaying swords, armor, and other martial artefacts from ancient times through the Edo period. The museum then provides a chronological account of key events in Japanese history, including the Meiji Restoration, the Satsuma Rebellion (Japan's last civil war), the construction of Yasukuni Jinja, the First Sino-Japanese War, the Russo-Japanese War, the Mukden Incident, the Second Sino-Japanese War, and the Greater East Asia War.
 
The museum also features special exhibitions on the three Emperors of the Meiji, Taishô, and Shôwa eras, showcasing artefacts related to each of these monarchs. Additionally, there are displays explaining the Shrine's ritual of summoning spirits. Towards the end of the exhibition, there is a section dedicated to the personal belongings of fallen soldiers. Finally, visitor reach the Great Exhibition Hall, where they can view a range of modern military equipment. This is one of the few areas where photography is allowed.
 
Navy dive-bomber 'Suisei'
 
The Atsuta 21 aircraft engine for 'Suisei'
 
The 'Suisei' (彗星) was the last naval bomber officially adopted by the Imperial Japanese Navy in December 1943. A total of 2,157 units were produced before the end of the war. Due to the changing dynamics of the war, many of these bombers were converted for use as fighter aircraft or kamikaze (suicide attack) planes, resulting in the loss of most of the fleet.
 
The 'Suisei Model 11' displayed at the museum was discovered in 1972 in the jungles beside an old runway on the Caroline Islands in the western Pacific. In 1980, the aircraft was sent to the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force's Kisarazu Airbase for restoration. It was then donated to Yasukuni Jinja on 5th April 1981.
 
Rocket Powered Glider 'Ohka'
 
Hanging above the 'Suisei' is the rocket-powered kamikaze aircraft, the 'Ohka' (桜花), specifically designed for suicide attacks. The term 'kamikaze' (神風), literally means 'divine wind', refers to 'special attacks' – a euphemism for suicide missions. As Japan's situation worsened in the latter years of the war, the military adopted a strategy of 'one man, one craft, one bomb for one ship', primarily launching suicide attacks against American warships. Initially, these missions were carried out by ordinary fighter planes loaded with fuel and explosives, which would then crash into enemy ships. The units tasked with these operations were called the 'Kamikaze Special Attack Corps' (神風特攻隊).
 
However, the heavy losses of aircraft and experienced pilots led to the development of a dedicated aircraft for suicide missions: the 'Ohka' Model 11, introduced in 1944. Rather than a conventional plane, the 'Ohka' was more akin to a manned air-to-ground missile. Its front was armed with a 1.2-ton TNT warhead, and its rear was fitted with a rocket engine. The aircraft could reach speeds of 630 km/h and, during a dive, could exceed 1,040 km/h. However, its range was only 36 km, and it had no landing gear. The cockpit door could not be opened from the inside, meaning the pilot had no way of escaping, making the mission a one-way trip.
 
Human Torpedo 'Kaiten'
 
The interior of 'Kaiten'
 
Just as there were suicide attacks from the skies, there were also similar acts at sea. The 'Kaiten' (回天), a manned suicide torpedo, was developed based on Japan's first oxygen-powered torpedo, the Type 93 Model 3. It was designed to sink large enemy ships, particularly Allied battleships. The Japanese Navy began officially using the Kaiten towards the end of the Pacific War in 1944.
 
The name 'Kaiten', which translates to 'return to heaven', symbolised the final hope in a losing cause – a desperate decision to reverse the tide of war at the cost of one's life. The torpedo was intended to be piloted directly into enemy vessels, and the mission was always a one-way trip, with the pilot effectively sacrificing themselves in an attempt to achieve a decisive strike. The Kaiten on display at the museum was originally housed at the US Army Museum in Hawaii. With the help of the Kaiten Association, the US permanently loaned the torpedo to Yasukuni Jinja in October 1979, where it has been preserved and exhibited ever since.
 
The stone plaque of Nankai Jinja
 
'The Stone Plaque of Nankai Jinja' (南海神社社号碑) is the exhibit at Yasukuni Jinja most closely associated with Hong Kong. During the Japanese occupation of Hong Kong, the occupying authorities established at least 2 shrines on Hong Kong Island: Hong Kong Jinja and Nankai Jinja. The Hong Kong Jinja was located in what was then renamed 'Taishô Park' (大正公園), now known as the Hong Kong Zoological and Botanical Gardens. Construction of the shrine began in 1942, and it was completed on 8th February 1945. However, shortly after its completion, Japan announced its surrender, and with the Liberation of Hong Kong, the Hong Kong Jinja was dismantled.
 
The Nankai Jinja was established at the Japanese military's Hong Kong Island Fleet Headquarters (the original Victoria Barracks). It was built to enshrine the spirits of Japanese soldiers who died during the 'Battle of Hong Kong'. After Japan's surrender, the British Army resumed use of the Victoria Barracks and carried out renovations, but the stone plaque of Nankai Jinja remained in place. In 1978, just before the barracks was relocated, the British Army proactively contacted Japan to ask if they wished to take the plaque. Since similar plaques from other occupied territories had all been destroyed, this one had become particularly precious. Japan readily accepted the offer, and the monument was subsequently displayed at the Yûshûkan.
 
Memorial Statue of Kamikaze Pilot
 
80 pound bronze cannon, originally built in Shinagawa Fortress
 
Memorial Monument for Escort Ship
 
Memorial Statue of War Widow with Children
 
Monument to Dr Pal
 
Dr Radhabinod Pal, often referred to as the 'incompetent judge' due to his dissenting opinion, was the only one of the 11 judges at the Tokyo Trials to acquit all 28 Class-A war criminals, declaring them 'not guilty'. As a result, he gained significant regard in Japan, particularly among nationalist and right-wing circles. In recognition of his position, Yasukuni Jinja erected a monument in his honour. The inscription (in Japanese only) on the monument reads as follows:-
 
Dr Radhabinod Pal, as the judge representing India at the 'International Military Tribunal for the Far East', established in Tokyo in May 1946, devoted himself to the immense task of researching and analysing voluminous historical materials related to the trail, without concern for any other matter, until the conclusion and judgment in November 1948.
 
Dr Pal was the only judge among the eleven appointed by the Allied nations who was an expert in international law. At the same time, he was a man of passionate conviction in upholding the justice of the law, possessing profound historical insight on civilisation.
 
Dr Pal saw the 'Tokyo Trials' as merely a ritual of barbaric revenge by the victorious Allied nations against a now powerless, defeated Japan. He demonstrated that the Allied prosecution, riddled with factual misjudgments, had absolutely no legal basis, and publicly issued a vast opinion declaring all of the defendants not guilty.
 
As he stated in the conclusion of his opinion, now that the fervour for revenge among the majority of the Allied nations and the historical prejudices have gradually subsided, his ruling has come to be recognised as an established principle in the international legal community of the civilised world.
 
We hereby commemorate the courage and passion of Dr Pal, who upheld both the justice of the law and the truth of history, and we establish this monument to engrave his words as a precious legacy for the people of Japan. Through this, we seek to transmit his great achievements for all eternity.
 
Firstly, Pal was the judge who missed the most days of the trial among the 11 judges. The trial lasted for 466 days, during which Pal was absent for 109 days to visit his sick wife. The second-highest absentee was the presiding judge of the tribunal, Sir William Webb from Australia, who missed 53 days. Pal even submitted his resignation to Allied Commander Douglas MacArthur, but it was firmly rejected. While there may have been understandable reasons for his absences, whether he was truly 'without concern for any other matter' is open to interpretation.
 
Secondly, Pal was not an expert in international law. He was originally a lawyer specialising in commercial taxation and only served as a judge at the Calcutta High Court between 1941 and 1944. Afterward, he became the Vice-Chancellor of the University of Calcutta, a position he held until 1946, when he was appointed as a judge for the Tokyo Trials. His legal career as a judge was extremely brief. It was only after becoming involved in the Tokyo Trials that Pal began studying international law, and his appointment to the tribunal was the result of a series of events (which is precisely why MacArthur rejected his resignation).
 
Although the concerns raised by Pal, including the issue of ex post facto law and the organisation of the tribunal, may have been legally valid in theory, the majority still reject his ruling. It is by no means 'recognised as an established principle in the international legal community of the civilised world'.
 
Pal's Appointment
 
In the initial draft of the IMTFE Charter, the number of judges was limited to nine, representing the Allied nations that signed Japan's surrender documents, including the US, the Republic of China, Britain, the Soviet Union, Australia, Canada, France, the Netherlands, and New Zealand. However, India raised an objection, arguing that Indians were also victims of Japanese atrocities and had contributed to the war effort. Therefore, they claimed, India was more qualified to appoint a judge than countries such as France or the Netherlands. They also pointed out that the tribunal was composed entirely of white judges and stressed the importance of including representatives from other racial backgrounds, beyond just the Chinese.
 
At the time, however, India was still a British colony and not yet an independent nation. The original 9 judges had already been deemed sufficient, and the US strongly opposed adding another judge. Eventually, India lobbied Britain for support, and with backing from Britain, New Zealand, Australia, and Canada, the US reluctantly agreed to include India in the Charter. The Philippines, also a non-sovereign territory at the time, was similarly included. This raises the question of whether the Charter of the tribunal was, in fact, a 'moving goalpost'.
 
India successfully secured a seat for a judge, but internally, there was little enthusiasm for the appointment, and no judge was initially willing to take on the role. After more than a month of deliberations, India eventually appointed Pal, simply because he was the only one willing to accept the post. The Tokyo Trials were originally expected to last six months, but as the trial progressed slowly, Pal eventually submitted his resignation. Given the controversy caused by India's effort to secure a judge, it was unthinkable for them to back out at this stage, so his resignation was, of course, rejected.
 
Pal's Errors
 
When India pushed for the appointment of a judge, it raised a left-wing argument, namely that all the judges, except for Chinese representative, were from white nations. Yet, Pal himself made a ruling that contradicted the Indian government's position, and his reasoning was also left-leaning. Pal was an anti-colonialist who believed that colonisation was a form of bullying by stronger nations against weaker ones. Similarly, he viewed the Tokyo Trials as an instance of victorious nations bullying a defeated Japan. However, wasn't Japan itself engaging in a form of colonisation when it invaded other, less-developed Asian countries?
 
India followed the Common Law system, which contrasts with the Civil Law system. In Common Law countries, judges are not only required to interpret written statutes but also to base their rulings on customs, traditions, and morals. A key feature of Common Law is that judges must write detailed judgments, which include various points of view on the case. These 'precedents' then become part of the law. In this way, judges act not only as decision-maker but also as lawmakers.
 
As the Common Law system gives judges considerable influence over the law, they must come from a background in law, typically having been practising lawyers. This differs from Civil Law countries, where judges can be trained solely in judicial processes. In simple terms, judges in Civil Law countries are like examiners, grading cases according to written guidelines, without necessarily needing a deep understanding of the subject matter. However, Common Law judges require a thorough understanding of the case content in order to make informed decisions.
 
Pal's objection to ex post facto law, viewed from a Civil Law perspective, is entirely understandable. This is why his opinion found support from judges in France and the Netherlands, who adhered to Civil Law traditions. However, as a judge from a Common Law background, Pal should have been able to make a judgment based on reason and morality, even in the absence of specific guidelines under the IMTFE Charter.
 
Additionally, Pal questioned why only the defeated nations were being prosecuted while the crimes of the victorious nations were being ignored. He argued that the IMTFE itself was an inherently unjust institution. While it may be possible to agree with this view from an objective standpoint, the role of a judge is not to decide on the legitimacy of the tribunal itself but to judge the cases brought before them. Even in a regular criminal court, it is the prosecutor's responsibility to decide whom to charge. A judge does not control the prosecution's decisions. If Pal believed that the tribunal itself was unjust, he should never have accepted the appointment in the first place.
 
The Role of the Emperor
 
Compared to the issue like ex post facto law and the lack of prosecution for Allied war crimes, the most widely criticised aspect of the Tokyo Trials by Western scholars is the fact that Emperor Shôwa was not indicted. From a personal perspective, I don't agree with the idea that 'the Emperor is innocent', but I do acknowledge that not prosecuting him was politically necessary, and that he played a significant role in Japan's wartime actions.
 
Those who argue for the Emperor's innocence claim that after the Meiji Restoration and the establishment of the Constitution of the Empire of Japan, the Emperor became merely a 'ceremonial monarch' under a constitutional monarchy, and that wars were not initiated by his direct orders. While Japan did emulate Britain in areas such as the Royal Family and diplomatic protocol, as well as industrial and technological advancements, the country's model for constitutional reform was not Britain, but Germany. Like Germany, the Japanese Prime Minster was appointed by the Emperor, and the ministers of state (the Cabinet) were accountable to the Emperor, not to the Imperial Diet (the Parliament). The Emperor had the power to reject decisions made by the Parliament, and the military was directly under his command.
 
Although the Mukden Incident was initiated by the military without the Emperor's direct approval, once it was successful, the Emperor gave his compliment. After the invasion of China began, every action taken by the military was reported to the Emperor, and many senior military positions were held by members of the Royal Family. The orders to use biological and chemical weapons also came from the Emperor. The claim that 'the Emperor was unaware of the reality of the war' is simply untrue. Even if some argue that the phrase 'in the Emperor's name' was a mere formality and that the cabinet led the decisions, the Emperor's failure to oppose the atrocities can be seen as tacit approval, and thus he bears responsibility.
 
After World War I, Kaiser Wilhelm II was deposed, but this paved the way for Adolf Hitler. The Emperor of Japan held a far higher position in the hearts of the Japanese people than the Germen Emperor did in Germany. If the Emperor had been removed, it would not only collapse the symbolic pillar of the country, but it would also have brought calamity to those within the imperial institution and beyond. The cost of removing the Emperor would likely have been far greater than creating another Hitler. This is one of the reasons why the US was relatively gentle with post-war Japan: there were no massive territorial concessions or reparations, and the Emperor was not held accountable.
 
Americans are pragmatic, and it was seen as more beneficial to retain the Emperor than to dispose of him. By leading the nation in expressing regret and remorse for the war crimes, the Emperor helped, though not entirely halting the rise of right-wing thinking, to significantly curb the nation's slide toward extremism. Emperor Shôwa's decision to stop visiting Yasukuni Jinja after the Class-A war criminals were enshrined there, followed by the actions of Emperor Emeritus Akihito (上皇明仁) and the current Emperor Naruhito (徳仁), who also ceased visiting, signalled a decisive move to prevent the expansion of right-wing forces.
 
Cultural Differences between Chinese and Japanese Attitudes toward the Deceased
 
In traditional Chinese culture, it is believed that criminals should be 'denied a burial place' (死無髒身之地) and 'never be reincarnated' (永不超生). The consequences of their wrongdoings must be borne not just by them but also by their descendants, even after death. However, in Japan, there is a completely different perspective on life and death. Japanese culture holds that once a person dies, their sins are erased, and even those who have committed heinous crimes should be venerated after death.
 
Take the case of SAIGO Takamori (西郷 隆盛), a key figure in the Meiji Restoration. Initially a prominent leader, he fell out of favour with Emperor Meiji in 1873 due to a disagreement over the invasion of Korea. Along with others who supported the Korean campaign, Saigo was forced to retire. He later gathered followers in Kyûshû (九州) and led a samurai rebellion, which culminated in the Satsuma Rebellion of 1877. Despite leadingf the rebellious forces, Saigo was posthumously venerated, with multiple 'Nanshû Jinja' (南洲神社) dedicated to him.
 
Some may argue that Saigo's contributions to the Meiji Restoration justify his veneration, but what about foreign invaders? The Mongol invasions of Japan in 1274 and 1281, carried out by the Yuan Empire, were undoubtedly acts of aggression. Yet in Fukuoka, there is a shrine called 'Genkô Jinja' (元寇神社), dedicated to the Mongol soldiers who died in Japan. This illustrates a cultural tradition in Japan of venerating the deceased, regardless of their actions in life.
 
In comparison to the veneration of war criminals, I believes the more significant issue with Yasukuni Jinja lies in the inaccuracies within the content it displays.
 
Attitudes of Neighbouring Countries
 
While it's true that some of the narratives in the Yûshûkan may be questionable in terms of their accuracy, the modern weapons on display undeniably highlight the remarkable transfomration that Japan underwent after the Meiji Restoration. The development of heavy industry not only matched the Western world but, in some cases, surpassed it. In contrast, what about China? Once revered by neighbouring nations, offering tribute and imparting wisdom, China eventually fell from its pedestal and become an object of scorn, easily manipulated by others. For over a century, China has been driven be resentment toward external forces, yet it has failed to genuinely reflect on its own stagnation and shortcomings.
 
It's important to remember that Japan's Meiji Restoration and China's Self-Strengthening Movement occurred simultaneously, but Japan succeeded where China faltered, largely due to arrogance and resistance to change. Even today, many in China oversimplify the failure of that era, attributing it solely to Empress Dowager Tzu-Hsi (慈禧太后) misappropriating funds meant for the navy to build the Summer Palace (頤和園). However, they fail reflect on how both the government and society, at all levels, were deeply sceptical of Western culture and technology. The Self-Strengthening Movement centered on preserving traditional Chinese ideals, selectively adopting Western technologies. In contrast, Japan's Meiji Restoration involved a full-scale embrace of Westernisation, followed by a selective incorporating of traditional Japanese culture.
 
Earlier, I mentioned that China and South Korea have been the most vocal in criticising Japan. In my view, they are the least qualified to do so. If you search online for 'Japan does not apologise', most of the results come from China. Has Japan really not apologised? From the Emperor to the Prime Minister, Japan has officially apologised many times. In fact, Mao Zedong once expressed frustration with the repeated apologies, ironically turning it into a form of gratitude towards Japan, stating that without Japan's aggression, China wouldn't have easily gained power. Supporters of Mao claim this is 'dark humour', but he was hardly known for his comedic sense. Even your own leaders have suggested that there have been too many apologies. Does this country still have the right to criticise Japan for a lack of apology?
 
Now let's turn to Korea. Today, South Korea stands at the height of its cultural influence and is a global trendsetter. But when it comes to politics and history, I have little repect for that country. South Korea often presents itself as a victim, yet it was actually a perpetrator during World War II, not a victim. There were many soldiers of Korean descent in the Japanese military, and even the Crown Prince Yi Un (李垠) of the Korean Empire held the rank of lieutenant general in the Japanese Army. Numerous other members of the Yi Royal Family also served in the Japanese military.
 
According to many elders who lived through the wars, the immoral behaviour of Korean soldiers during the war often surpassed that of Japanese soldiers. Does such a country have the right to criticise others?
 
Japan once invaded other countries due to its inherent disadvantages, plundering resources and committing numerous inhumane acts. But today, Japan, after modernising and undergoing rapid post-war economic growth, has worked tirelessly to compensate for its past wrongs. Japan may have even become an object of envy for other nations. The right-wing street demonstrations, which are often ridiculed by locals, are now the only spiritual reminders for the far-right forces. These demonstrations and their conflicts with anti-war protesters, which occur on Shinto festival days at Yasukuni Jinja, serve as proof that Japan has moved away from its past obsessions and is now walking the path of democracy and freedom.
 
Totalitarianism inevitably leads to tragedy. Totalitarianism encompasses not only militarism but also National Socialism (Nazism), fascism, and communism. When one finger is pointing at others, we should always pay attention to where the other fingers are pointing. Today's Japan is an open, democratic, and civilised nation, and the countries we should truly be wary of are those that continue to yearn for totalitarianism and harbour hostility towards others.
 
 
Article menu for this trip:
 
Pre-arrival [Japan tour 2025] From Manchester to London ~ Hilton Garden Inn London Heathrow Terminals 2 & 3
[Japan tour 2025] From Heathrow to Haneda: flight JL42 & immigration in Japan
Day 1 [Japan tour 2025] The Railway Museum, the largest railway museum in Japan
[Japan tour 2025] Daiba: The Life-sized Unicorn Gundam Statue & Odaiba Marine Park
[Japan tour 2025] Dormy Inn PREMIUM Ginza: bargain accommodation
Day 2 [Japan tour 2025] Asakua: Sensôji, one of major Buddhist temples
[Japan tour 2025] Yasukuni Jinja, a shrine of martyrs and the place of taboo
[Japan tour 2025] Crabs all-you-can-eat in Ueno: Gozzo Ueno Hirokôji
Day 3 [Japan tour 2025] Toyosu Market: Daiwa Sushi, and visiting the Fruit and Vegetable Market
[Japan tour 2025] Atami: Izusan Shrine & Atami Castle
[Japan tour 2025] Tsukinoakari, a hidden hotspring accommodation
Day 4 [Japan tour 2025] Izu Highland: Mt Ômuro and the Steak House Kanai
[Japan tour 2025] Katasekan Hiina, a seaside hotspring inn in Izu Peninsula
Day 5 [Japan tour 2025] Ryôsenji temple in Shimoda, the first step to modernise Japan
[Japan tour 2025] Mishima Grand Shrine – say goodbye to Izu
[Japan tour 2025] Shuhoukaku Kogetsu: a hotspring inn in front of Mt Fuji and Lake Kawaguchi
Day 6 [Japan tour 2025] Worship observatory of Kawaguchi Asama Shrine – Torii gate in the sky
[Japan tour 2025] Fujiyoshida Retro high street; famous food in Kawaguchiko – Hôtô; and the second dinner in Shuhoukaku Kogetsu
Day 7 [Japan tour 2025] Fujinomiya: Shiraitonotaki 'White Silk Fall'; and Fujisan Hongu Sengen Main Shrine, the orginal shrine of Mt Fuji
[Japan tour 2025] Gotemba PREMIUM OUTLETS
[Japan tour 2025] Hotel Gracery Shinjuku: the Godzilla's hotel
Day 8 [Japan tour 2025] Kamakura: Tsurugaoka Hachimangû, Komachidôri high street, and the Kôtokuin (the Great Buddha statue)
[Japan tour 2025] Enoshima: please pay for the escalator
Day 9 [Japan tour 2025] Tokyo Tower; and Zôjôji, a Buddhist temple
[Japan tour 2025] Tsukiji Outer Market
[Japan tour 2025] Meiji Imperial Shrine, a Shrine for Emperor Meiji
Day 10 [Japan tour 2025] Narita Airport: see you, Japan!
 
 
Please following my Instagram:

No comments:

Post a Comment

[Japan tour 2025] Mishima Grand Shrine – say goodbye to Izu

中文版請按此   Date: 7th January 2025 (Tuesday)     After le...